Case Comment: Indian Young Lawyers Association vs The State Of Kerala

By Avani Jain

Introduction

 Any connection to the Creator transcends societally created artificial barriers, existing outside the confines of negotiated relationships defined by terms and conditions. Such a relationship and display of devotion are indelible fashioned by faith, free of the limits imposed by dogmatic views rooted in rigid socio-cultural standards that fail to meet constitutional requirements. The effect of patriarchy in religious situations should not eclipse the purity of devotion, which stems from faith and the freedom to practice and confess one's religion. The Sabarimala Temple in Kerala is devoted to Lord Ayyappa, a Naishtik Brahmachari. Because of this, ladies aged 10 to 50 were barred from entering the temple to worship Lord Ayyappa. But is it acceptable to discriminate against religious practices? It violates the right to equality stated in the Indian Constitution. The Travancore Devaswom Board, established under the Cochin Hindu Religious Institution Act of 1950, runs the Sabarimala Temple. Over time, this religious heritage has clashed with women's rights. Today, in the modern world, people in India cannot be discriminated against for any cause. Separating religion from its deities is regarded as a violation of women's rights.

Facts of the case

 This writ case seeks directions against the government and the District Magistrate to ensure that female devotees aged ten to fifty years be permitted admission to the Lord Ayyappa Temple at Sabarimala (Kerala). The writ petition was filed in response to their refusal of admittance due to traditional norms and practices. The petition also seeks to declare Rule 3(b)[1] of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, invalid. This declaration is based on the premise that the rule violates Articles 14[1], 15[2], and 25[1] of the Indian Constitution, particularly as interpreted by Article 51A(e). Furthermore, the petition seeks directives to improve the safety of female pilgrims visiting the temple.

 The following concerns were raised in the Sabarimala case: 1. Whether excluding women is discriminatory and breaches Articles 14, 15, and 17. Furthermore, the religious practice contradicts Articles 25 and 26 of India's Constitution. 2. Whether this religious practice fall under Article 25 of the Indian Constitution?

3. Does the Ayappa Temple qualify as a religious institution for the purposes of Article 26 of the Indian Constitution? If so, another concern is whether this type of denomination is under the jurisdiction of the statutory body. Do the provisions of Articles 14, 15 (3), 39 (a), and 51 A(e) also apply to these discriminatory acts? Can religious organizations exclude women between the ages of 10 and 50 from entering using Rule 3 of the 1965 Rules? Wouldn't it be against Articles 14 and 15(3) of the Indian Constitution if such were the case?

Observation of the Supreme Court

Nevertheless, it was decided that the Respondents' request that the pilgrims at the Sabarimala temple be referred to as Ayyappans since they are devotees of Lord Ayyappa fulfilled the third prerequisite for a religious sect. There was no acknowledged Ayyappan community. All Hindu enthusiasts are welcome to visit the temple. We have also been informed that there is no such prohibition and that there are other temples dedicated to Lord Ayyappa. As a result, there was no acknowledged sect. Consequently, it was decided that the Sabarimala temple was a site of worship supported by the public and that there were no identified members of the cult who belonged to it exclusively. [3]

The custom of keeping women out of temples goes against their right to visit and enter places where they are free to practice Hinduism and express their love for Lord Ayyappa. Denying women the opportunity to worship is a grave violation of their right to freedom. The protection afforded by Article 25(1) extends to intrafaith parity as well as interfaith parity. Consequently, a non-discriminatory right that was equally available to men and women of all age groups who professed the same faith was included in the broad definition of Article 25(1)'s freedom to practice religion.

Constitutional morality, taken literally, means rigorously and unwaveringly adhering to the values outlined in each of the document's numerous sections. A country's constitution also carries with it the obligation that its core principles be revered by both high ranking constitutional officials and all of its population. This obligation is imposed by the Constitution because it provides the fundamental framework that ensures that the democratic system that the people have been promised is protected and never disrupted.[1]

Constitutional morality is a broader concept that goes beyond simply adhering to the core principles of constitutionalism. It includes virtues such as promoting an accepting and diverse community while simultaneously respecting the other principles of constitutionalism. For this reason, the idea of constitutional morality goes beyond simply upholding constitutionalism's core principles. Moreover, the ideas of constitutionalism permeate the State's operations for the good of all its citizens as a result of maintaining constitutional morality[4].

In light of the aforementioned authorities, it is imperative to determine whether the exclusionary practice of women between the ages of 10 and 50 is analogous to a Hindu religious doctrine or a practice that could be regarded as an essential part of the Hindu religion, and whether the fundamental nature of the Hindu religion would alter if the aforementioned exclusionary practice were to cease.

Decision

The Supreme Court found in a 4:1 judgment that the age restrictions on women's entry to the Sabrimala temple between the ages of 10 and 50 were invalid, overturning Rule 3(b) of the KHPW Act. The Court also issued directions to guarantee female pilgrims' safety as they approached the place.

The majority found that followers of Lord Ayyappa were not a separate religious denomination, but rather a subset of Hinduism, and that the exclusion of women could not be regarded an important religious practice in the lack of biblical or textual proof. The court also ruled that Rule 3(b) went against the aim of the KHPW Act, which was to reform and open public Hindu places to all people. The Court also declared Rule 3(b) of the KHPW Rules illegal for violating Part III of the Indian Constitution.

Justice D.Y. Chandrachud went on to say that social exclusion of women based on physiological characteristics such as menstrual status was comparable to untouchability, following notions of "purity and pollution," which stigmatized individuals, and could not be justified in the scheme of constitutional morality, in addition to being expressly prohibited by Article 17[1].

In her dissenting opinion, Justice I. Malhotra ruled that the lawsuit should be dismissed due to the petitioners' lack of standing. She also determined that Ayyappans, or Sabarimala Temple followers, met the criteria for classification as a religious denomination and hence qualified for Article 26 protections. She also determined that a minor restriction on women's admission would not violate Part III of the Constitution.

Analysis

The Writ Petition raises concerns about not only the Sabarimala Temple in Kerala, but also other places of worship in the state. Country with their own views, habits, and customs. Usages that may be regarded discriminatory. In a Secular politics, fundamentally religious issues, In most circumstances, courts should refrain from interfering with sentiment. In Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam & Ors. v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr.[5], the Court was requested to review the appointment of archakas in Writ Petitions filed by an association of archakas and individual archakas from Madurai's Sri Meenakshi Amman Temple.

To petition the Supreme Court under Article 32 for a violation of fundamental rights, petitioners must show that their personal right to worship in the Temple has been violated. The petitioners do not identify as Sabarimala Temple devotees, who adore Lord Ayyappa as a 'Naishtik Brahmachari'. Allowing PILs that challenge religious practices in a diverse community with numerous religions and traditions may be detrimental to the country's secular and constitutional structures.

Though our Constitution ensures religious freedom and the associated rights and practices, this Court will be guided by a commitment to uphold the Constitution's principles of dignity, liberty, and equality. In a constitutional hierarchy of priorities, these are the values that serve as the foundation for the Constitution's structure.

These beliefs have been used to bind women, deny them equal rights, and subject them to the limitations of a patriarchal society. A woman's menstrual cycle cannot be used as a legitimate constitutional basis to deny her dignity or autonomy as a person. A woman's menstrual condition was exceedingly sensitive and crucial to her privacy.

The caste system was predicated on different types of women's subjection. Women's menstruation is stigmatized in Indian society because to the concepts of purity and filth. In ancient religious writings and practices, menstruating women were supposed to pollute their environment. Menstruation, regardless of a woman's rank, was associated with impurity, and the concept of impurity was later used to explain their exclusion from important social activities. Our society is governed by the Constitution. Constitutional moral norms are an inalienable right.

The Constitution establishes each individual as its essential unit. The rights recognized by Part III of the Constitution are aimed at recognizing the individual as the fundamental unit. Individuals have rights under Part III of the Constitution. The deity could be a legal person under religious law, with the ability to exercise property rights. However, the deity is not classified as a person under Part III of the Constitution. The legal fiction that resulted in the recognition of a deity as a juristic person could not be applied to the entire set of rights granted by Part III of the Constitution. In any case, the ban on women entering the Sabarimala shrine has an impact on both religious and civic rights of individual.

Conclusion

The freedom to profess religion is a fundamental right that cannot be violated by the state or a non-governmental organization. Article 25 allows the state to limit the freedom to profess religion for reasons of health, morality, and public order. However, the court will eventually determine if such a restriction is required for social welfare, public order, or the preservation of health and morality.

Article 14's equality idea is not incompatible with Article 25's basic right to freely practice and propagate one's religion. Women have an essential role in society, and discrimination based simply on gender is not only illegal, but also arbitrary and contrary to natural justice. Any act falling under the purview of Article 26, which grants management rights to a religious denomination, cannot continue to violate the fundamental right to equality guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution on arbitrary grounds, and Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution must be in constructive harmony.

[1] Women who are not by custom and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship shall not be entitled to enter or offer worship in any place of public worship.

[2] Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth

[3] Dipak Misra, C.J.I. (for himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.)

[4] Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [( 2018 ) 10 SCC 1]

[5] (2016) 2 SCC 725